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Abstract. On 3 September 2017 official channels of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea announced the suc-
cessful test of a thermonuclear device. Only seconds to min-
utes after the alleged nuclear explosion at the Punggye-ri
nuclear test site in the mountainous region in the country’s
northeast at 03:30:02 (UTC), hundreds of seismic stations
distributed all around the globe picked up strong and distinct
signals associated with an explosion. Different seismological
agencies reported body wave magnitudes of well above 6.0,
consequently estimating the explosive yield of the device on
the order of hundreds of kT TNT equivalent. The 2017 event
can therefore be assessed as being multiple times larger in
energy than the two preceding North Korean events in Jan-
uary and September 2016.
This study provides a multi-technology analysis of the
2017 North Korean event and its aftermath using a wide ar-
ray of geophysical methods. Seismological investigations lo-
cate the event within the test site at a depth of approximately
0.6 km below the surface. The radiation and generation of
P- and S-wave energy in the source region are significantly
influenced by the topography of the Mt. Mantap massif. In-
versions for the full moment tensor of the main event re-
veal a dominant isotropic component accompanied by sig-
nificant amounts of double couple and compensated linear
vector dipole terms, confirming the explosive character of the
event. The analysis of the source mechanism of an aftershock
that occurred around 8 min after the test in the direct vicinity
suggest a cavity collapse. Measurements at seismic stations
of the International Monitoring System result in a body wave
magnitude of 6.2, which translates to an yield estimate of
around 400 kT TNT equivalent. The explosive yield is pos-
sibly overestimated, since topography and depth phases both
tend to enhance the peak amplitudes of teleseismic P waves.
Interferometric synthetic aperture radar analysis using data
from the ALOS-2 satellite reveal strong surface deforma-
tions in the epicenter region. Additional multispectral optical
data from the Pleiades satellite show clear landslide activ-
ity at the test site. The strong surface deformations generated
large acoustic pressure peaks, which were observed as infra-
sound signals with distinctive waveforms even at distances
of 401 km. In the aftermath of the 2017 event, atmospheric
traces of the fission product 133Xe were detected at various
locations in the wider region. While for 133Xe measurements
in September 2017, the Punggye-ri test site is disfavored as
a source by means of atmospheric transport modeling, detec-
tions in October 2017 at the International Monitoring System
station RN58 in Russia indicate a potential delayed leakage
of 133Xe at the test site from the 2017 North Korean nuclear
test.
1 Introduction
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and
its associated entity, the Preparatory Commission for the
CTBT organization (CTBTO), are dedicated to monitoring
and banning nuclear explosions worldwide – underground,
in water, or in the atmosphere. The CTBT was opened for
signature in 1996 but will only enter into force after the 44
nuclear technology holders (states listed in Annex 2 of the
CTBT) will have signed and ratified the treaty. At the time
of this study, eight Annex 2 states have still not ratified the
treaty, including North Korea. To detect, locate, and charac-
terize nuclear explosions, an International Monitoring Sys-
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tem (IMS) was established by the CTBTO as part of a verifi-
cation regime. The IMS features four different approaches
for the monitoring of potential nuclear explosions. Three
methods (seismology, infrasound, and hydroacoustics) are at-
tributed to waveform technologies and have the purpose of
detecting, localizing, and identifying suspicious events with
an explosive source mechanism. The fourth approach fea-
tures the monitoring of particulate radionuclides and noble
gases in the atmosphere and potentially provides unambigu-
ous evidence of the nuclear character of an explosion. To as-
sess the connection between radionuclide detections and po-
tential source events, atmospheric transport modeling (ATM)
is applied. Grouping data from different IMS technologies
that is attributed to the same critical event is referred to as
data fusion. For further information on the CTBT, the IMS,
and the German National Data Center, the reader is referred
to Pilger et al. (2017) or CTBTO (2018).
Since the first known nuclear test, carried out by the Unites
States in 1945, more than 2000 confirmed nuclear explosion
tests were conducted by China, France, Great Britain, India,
North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States. It is
generally accepted that all six past explosions in North Ko-
rea between 2006 and 2017 have been nuclear underground
tests. This study therefore refers to the events in North Korea
as nuclear tests, even though definitive proof may be miss-
ing. North Korea is the only country breaking the de facto
moratorium on nuclear tests. For detailed information on the
first five North Korean tests, see for example Hartmann et al.
(2017).
All past North Korean nuclear tests were conducted at the
Punggye-ri test site in the vicinity of Mt. Mantap in the north-
eastern part of the country. Following the geologic descrip-
tion of the test site area provided by Coblentz and Pabian
(2015) and Pabian and Coblentz (2017), Mt. Mantap is made
up of two distinct geologic formations. The core of the moun-
tain consists of igneous basement rock of either diorite or
granite, while the top is capped by a thin layer of basaltic
lava flows. The basement crystalline rock and the top layer
of Mt. Mantap are separated by a nearly horizontal sequence
of volcanic deposits with a thickness of around 200 m. The
origin of these deposits is suspected to be volcanic ash from
Mt. Paektu, a volcano located around 100 km northeast. Due
to their loose consolidation, the volcanic deposits are softer
then the basement rock or the basaltic layer and are therefore
more susceptible to erosion. Furthermore, the volcanic layer
is more exposed to erosional scars and landslides due to its
steeper slope. The erosion of the volcanic layer can cause the
overlaying basalt cap to break off at the scarp, which is vis-
ible in larger piles below the volcanic layer where the slope
of the mountain decreases slightly.
The official channels of North Korea announced the 2017
event as a successful test of a fusion bomb (Korean Cen-
tral News Agency, 2017). This would be a major step in the
nuclear program of North Korea. From a scientific point of
view, therefore, the depth of the event, its strength in terms
of radiated high- and low-frequency seismic energy, the con-
tribution of possible faulting or slope instability processes,
the near-surface damage in the test area, and the proof of
whether fission products are detected as atmospheric trac-
ers are key questions to be answered. These questions are
approached by an integrated study based on different seis-
mological (Sect. 2), infrasound (Sect. 3), remote-sensing
(Sect. 4), radionuclide monitoring (Sect. 5), and modeling
techniques which complement each other. As there is no easy
concept to verify and characterize nuclear explosions, espe-
cially in a country where direct observations are difficult to
assess, this study demonstrates and emphasizes the strength
of an integrated multi-technology approach.
In this context, new methodical approaches are introduced
to improve the depth estimate from teleseismic observations
and to quantify uncertainties in the non-isotropic source com-
ponent. The seismological study retrieves an independent ab-
solute location based on a combination of seismological and
remote-sensing data. The relative location between the six
North Korean nuclear tests is obtained by means of waveform
cross-correlation time lag data. The event depth is estimated
for the first time by a joint inversion of source time func-
tion (STF) and waveform composition of direct and depth
phases observed at small aperture, high-frequency arrays at
teleseimsic distances. A full waveform moment tensor inver-
sion (MTI) is applied and compared to results of previous
explosions in North Korea. The source time overshoot and
peak amplitude are compared to traditional body wave mag-
nitude (mb) estimates. Additionally, the effect of topography
on peak amplitudes is estimated by 2-D-waveform modeling
to assess the possible range of explosive yield. Infrasound
observations and modeling are used to understand the earth–
atmosphere coupling and the propagation of infrasound from
the North Korean test site. The analysis of satellite-based
remote-sensing data is important to improve the absolute lo-
cation of shallow sources as well as to quantify the secondary
mass movement effects at the surface. Radionuclide moni-
toring demonstrates the importance of ATM to avoid over-
interpretation of variations in 133Xe concentrations. While
radionuclide monitoring provides the only direct evidence of
nuclear explosions, it is demonstrated by careful modeling
how difficult it is to interpret such data and that early claims
of causal anomalies have possibly been over-interpreted.
2 Seismological investigations
2.1 Epicenter location
The localization in the Reviewed Event Bulletin (REB) of the
CTBTO International Data Center (IDC) uses 125 seismic
stations of the IMS and results in an epicenter of 41.321◦ N
and 129.035◦ E with an error ellipse area of 110 km2. This
relatively high error is generated by the fact that only eight
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IMS stations are located at distances of 400 up to 2100 km
(see Fig. 1a).
However, the incorporation of 25 additional seismic sta-
tions at regional distances cannot significantly improve the
absolute location estimate, as the closest station MDJ is still
372 km away from the test site. Due to these large source–
receiver distances, a further improvement of the absolute
location accuracy is limited. Nevertheless, relative location
methods can be applied for a high-precision localization of
the events (Zhang and Wen, 2013; Zhao et al., 2014, 2016;
Gibbons et al., 2017). In this study a relative location pro-
cedure based on the cross correlation of seismograms from
33 regional seismic stations for the six North Korean tests
is applied. Seismograms for the past North Korean events
significantly vary between the stations, due to propagation
paths from source to the surrounding stations at different dis-
tances and azimuths. However, the correlation of the seis-
mograms of the six events for each individual station shows
a good coherence between the corresponding signals, with
the Pn phase being the most pronounced arrival in the wave-
forms. These signals are correlated for each individual sta-
tion, which has recorded at least two North Korean nuclear
tests. The cross correlation between each pair of events is
performed using normalization to 1.0 for the autocorrelation
of each signal at zero lag. Maximum correlation values of
0.7 to 0.99 are obtained for stations of up to 1100 km dis-
tance for the four tests in the years 2009, 2013, and 2016.
Due to significant differences in explosive yield, and there-
fore different source time durations, the 2006 and 2017 tests
are slightly less correlated with the other tests. See Fig. 2 for
the complete results of the cross-correlation analysis.
The estimation of time lags turned out to be reliable, when
the maximum cross-correlation values exceeded a threshold
of 0.4. With this constraint, a subset of 165 event pairs for
19 stations was selected, for which precise travel-time dif-
ferences with an accuracy on the order of the sampling rate
used of 0.025 s could be determined. Pn-phase onset times of
all tests are aligned to the onset at the closest station MDJ
and fixed as relative start time for the estimation of the cor-
relation time lags at the other stations. A double-difference
method (e.g., Waldhauser and Ellsworth, 2000) is applied
to cross-correlation time lags and results suggest that the
last five events are located within a radius of 400 m, while
the 2006 test is located around 2 km further to the east (see
Fig. 1b). The relative locations of the six tests can be asso-
ciated with absolute coordinates as soon as the geographical
coordinates of one of the tests are known. The geographic,
absolute location of the January 2016 nuclear explosion is
fixed by means of radar interferometry data to the location
of the maximum surface deformation observed after the test
(Hartmann et al., 2017; Wei, 2017). The absolute epicenter
location of the 2017 test from relative location procedures
is consequently determined to be 41.3007◦ N, 129.0728◦ E
(Fig. 1b).
2.2 Estimation of hypocenter depth and seismic
moment
The source depth is needed to estimate the explosion process
and strength of the seismic source. However, constraining the
depth of a shallow source is difficult from regional and tele-
seismic data without a close station within a focal depth’s dis-
tance from the source. The modeling of the wavelet consist-
ing of a surface-reflected P phase, the so-called depth phase,
and STF can potentially help in such a case. Such a wavelet
modeling approach resembles the inverted and time-shifted
STF and needs high-frequency waveforms above 1 Hz to re-
solve the onset of the depth phase, and it may be difficult to
perform this from single station recordings if the signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) is poor at teleseimsic distances. An ap-
proach uncommon for nuclear test studies is used, which
was established for the analysis of induced seismicity, where
waveform beams are calculated at several small-aperture,
short-period arrays to enhance the SNR (Fig. 3a).
The beam waveforms represent a superposition of direct
and reflected waves. The depth of the explosion is esti-
mated by comparing observed and synthetic beam wave-
forms (Fig. 3d), which are calculated for the best moment
tensor solution described in Sect. 2.3, a common STF and
varying depths. The source time is represented as a compo-
sition of multiple basis functions with unknown weighting
coefficients, which are estimated in a least squares inversion
with a smoothing constraint (Fig. 4). If u(t) is the seismo-
gram (beam) at the array with coordinates rr and from a seis-
mic source with coordinates rs, the P-wave train (i.e., P plus






where · is a time convolution and where the summation con-
vention is applied. Gj,k are the spatial derivatives of the
Green’s function, where the comma before index ,k indicates
a spatial derivative with respect to xk . It is assumed that all
moment tensor components Mjk have the same time depen-
dency, which is described as normalized moment function
m(t) with m(t→∞)= 1. The displacement in the far field
is controlled by the time derivative ofm(t), which is declared
as moment rate function ṁ(t). This explains that the far-field
body wave pulses from earthquakes are single-sided pulses
(Dahm and Krüger, 2014). Since only the far-field wave field
is considered, the Green’s functions in Eq. (1) are replaced
by far-field Green’s functions G(ff), and m(t) is replaced by
ṁ(t). The inversion is set up for ṁ(t) using a set of N time-





where βl is a weighting factor and each hl(t) satisfies∫
hl(t)dt = 1.
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Figure 1. (a) Seismic stations of the International Monitoring System and other earthquake monitoring networks within a radius of 2100 km
from the North Korean Punggye-ri nuclear test site. Stations that are used in the moment tensor analysis in Sect. 2.3 are marked with a small
yellow dot. (b) Zoom into the Punggye-ri test site area. Numbered circles indicate the absolute locations of the six North Korean nuclear
tests. The relative location error for each test is less than 100 m. The dashed line marks the profile used in Sect. 2.5 to study topographic
influence of the Mt. Mantap on seismic energy generation and radiation from the test.


















The convolution in Eq. (3) can be written in discrete form,
leading to an overdetermined matrix system for unknown
weighting factors to be solved in a least squares sense us-
ing the L2 norm (Dahm and Krüger, 2014). If more than one
array is available, the equations are added to the coefficient
matrix to realize a joint inversion. Additionally, the STF in-
version is stabilized by using a regularization with a rough-
ness matrix. The STF is inverted for every single trial depth.
The length of the STF is constrained to 1.5 s, where 0.5 s
is considered before the arrival of the P wave. It should be
noted that, with a shorter length of STF, the details of the STF
with a complex structure are difficult to resolve. On the other
hand, with longer length of the STF, i.e., a larger number of
basis functions, the fitted curve oscillates wildly and gives a
very poor representation of the model; this is known as over-
fitting. The length of the STF mentioned before was chosen
to reach a compromise, after examining the residual misfit in
total signal variance computed for different lengths of source
time function. In order to compensate for travel-time resid-
uals occurring along the mantle ray, zero-lag Green’s func-
tions are correlated with P-wave beams at every array and
the travel-time corrections are considered before the inver-
sion. The source depth itself is estimated using a grid search
approach, where the depth of the point source Green’s func-
tions is sampled from 0 to 1500 m in 100 m steps. For every
depth solution the residuals are estimated and stored for final
evaluation.
Green’s functions are calculated using the code QSEIS
(Wang, 1999), where source- and station-specific crustal
models can be considered. AK135 (Kennett et al., 1995) is
used for the mantle, while different crustal profiles for source
and station regions are taken from CRUST 2.0 (Bassin et al.,
2000). Intrinsic attenuation for P waves is set to 5000, since
otherwise high frequencies are damped out at teleseismic dis-
tances. The sampling frequency is 20 Hz. The grid search
depth phase modeling has been applied previously to differ-
ent cases of induced seismicity (Dahm et al., 2007) and the
2016 nuclear explosion (Cesca et al., 2017), but the simulta-
neous STF inversion is implemented for the first time in this
study.
The full waveforms of beams, their peak heights, and peak
distances are well fitted in a joint inversion of four arrays.
The best fits are obtained at depths between 400 and 800 m
(Fig. 3b). However, it should be noted that the depth value
obtained from the inversion procedure might be overesti-
mated due to the use of an unperturbed velocity model. Per-
turbations in the velocity model, for example through po-
tential fracturing above the explosion, which would substan-
tially reduce P-wave velocity, were neglected. If the source of
the synthetic beams is placed deeper or shallower, the dura-
tion and appearance of the P , pP, and sP pulses changes and
residuals increase. Of interest are the retrieved moment rate
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Figure 2. Maximum correlation coefficients for the coherence of
the Pn phase for all available pairs of nuclear tests at 18 stations at
regional distances of up to 2100 km. Due to their similar size in ex-
plosive yield, the four tests in the years 2009, 2013, and 2016 have
a similar source mechanism and consequently show high maximum
correlation coefficients between 0.70 and 0.99. The seismic signals
for the 2006 and 2017 test are in general less correlated with the
other tests due to the different source durations suspected for these
two events. The 2006 and 2017 tests are the smallest and largest
explosion, respectively.
and moment function, which show a clear double pulse and
overshoot, respectively (Fig. 3c). Such an overshoot is not ex-
pected for the rupture process of tectonic earthquakes, where
the moment rate and moment functions of the P wave are
single-sided pulses and monotonously increasing functions,
respectively. For nuclear explosions, however, this feature is
commonly observed. This can be explained by at least a par-
tial collapse of the explosion cavity immediately after the ex-
plosion. In this case, the final moment is only 23 % of the
peak moment in Fig. 3c. The inversion of long-period waves
led to a seismic moment M0 of 2.33× 1017 Nm, represent-
ing the time after the overshoot. The peak seismic moment
is thus estimated in the range of M0,peak ≈ 1.02× 1018 Nm.
The associated low- and high-frequency moment magnitudes
(Mw) are Mw = 5.55 and M
(peak)
w = 5.97, respectively, and
can explain the large difference between the long-period Mw
and the high-frequency mb estimates which emerged during
the magnitude estimation described in Sect. 2.4.
2.3 Moment tensor inversion of the test and the main
aftershock
Seismic signals of the 2017 North Korean test show a great
similarity to those generated by the previous four nuclear
tests conducted in 2009, 2013, and 2016. Especially long-
period waveforms with periods above 10 s recorded at re-
gional distances show a high waveform similarity and a sub-
stantially increased amplitude, revealing a very similar radi-
ation pattern of all events and a larger moment release for the
2017 nuclear test. In recent years, MTIs have been performed
for nuclear tests in North Korea, including those carried out
in 2009, 2013, and 2016 (Ford et al., 2010; Barth, 2014;
Vavryc̆uk and Kim, 2014; Cesca et al., 2017; Hartmann et al.,
2017). All MTIs were performed by fitting low-frequency
full waveform seismic data at regional distances, either in
the time or in the frequency domain. The majority of these
solutions revealed a significant positive isotropic component.
For the 2013 nuclear test an extraordinarily high double cou-
ple (DC) component was found, indicating differences in
containment or near-source damaging effects (Barth, 2014;
Vavryc̆uk and Kim, 2014). For the 2017 test the seismic mo-
ment tensor is inverted by fitting the low-frequency ampli-
tude spectra (epicentral distances up to 1200 km) and full dis-
placement waveforms (epicentral distances up to 600 km) in
the frequency range from 0.02 to 0.04 Hz following the ap-
proach by Cesca et al. (2013, 2017). For the moment tensor
optimization, the Grond algorithm (Heimann et al., 2018) is
used, which searches the parameter space by random search
first and later by an increasingly denser search around the
best solutions. The algorithm finally resolves the full mo-
ment tensor components, the centroid location, and centroid
time and also provides information on model uncertainties
and source parameters trade-offs. Full waveforms and their
spectra are calculated assuming a layered crustal model pro-
posed by Ford et al. (2010). Examples of full waveform dis-
placement and amplitude spectra fits are shown in Fig. 5.
The moment tensor solution for the 2017 test shows a
dominant positive isotropic part of 60 %, 16 % positive com-
pensated linear vector dipole (CLVD), and 24 % of DC. The
best solution, found at a depth of around 2 km, has a scalar
moment of 2.33× 1017 Nm, equivalent to a Mw of 5.55. The
centroid depth is poorly resolved and good waveform fits
are found for very shallow sources down to 2.5 km. This
result confirms the very shallow depth of 400–800 m accu-
rately resolved by the analysis of depth phases in Sect. 2.2.
The moment tensor optimization resolves a broad ensem-
ble of well-fitting moment tensor solutions. They are plot-
ted using a source type diagram in Fig. 6 and are character-
ized by strong deviations from a pure DC model (mapping
in the center of the diagram), a typical model for tectonic
earthquakes. Instead, acceptable solutions are either domi-
nated by a positive isotropic component (positive values of
the y axis in the plot), a negative vertical CLVD (positive
values of the x axis), or a combination of both. The vari-
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Figure 3. (a) Setup of the depth analysis with the 2017 North Korean nuclear test marked as a red star and the four small-aperture, short-
period arrays marked as bluish triangles. The epicentral distances to arrays IMAR, BCA, YKA, and TXAR are 48◦, 54◦, 65◦, and 94◦,
respectively. (b) Residuals between observed and synthetic waveforms (L2 norm) as a function of depth of the explosion. (c) Least squares
source time function associated with the best-fit regularized solution. Solid and dashed lines are the normalized moment rate and moment
function, respectively. (d) Observed (black) and synthetic (red) waveforms for the best-fit regularized solution at 600 m depth. The gray and
green dashed lines indicate the theoretical arrival times of the P and pP phases, respectively. The traces are bandpass-filtered between 0.5 and
2.5 Hz.
ability among these type of solutions has been attributed to
trade-offs among moment tensor components for very shal-
low sources (Cesca et al., 2017; Cesca and Heimann, 2017).
This range of moment tensor solutions includes alternative
moment tensor configurations as proposed for previous nu-
clear explosions in North Korea (e.g., Barth, 2014).
In the aftermath of the nuclear test, a seismic event took
place in its direct vicinity around 8 min later. The estimated
scalar moment andMw are 1.88×1016 Nm and 4.81, respec-
tively, and thus the scalar moment is only∼ 8 % of the one of
the nuclear test. The waveforms of the aftershock still show a
sufficient SNR to perform an MTI. Waveform displacement
and amplitude spectra fits of the MTI are shown in Fig. 7.
The inversion is based on spectral and waveform fits at
stations located within 1000 km epicentral distance, filtered
between 0.02 and 0.04 Hz. The calculated depth of the af-
tershock is similar to the depth of the explosion. The best
MTI solution suggests a dominant implosive source compo-
nent (65 %), negative CLVD (29 %), and a DC component
of 6 %. This source mechanism is compatible with a shallow
collapse source or might hint at some kind of break-in pro-
cess. An ensemble of well-fitting moment tensor solutions
for this inversion is shown in Fig. 8.
2.4 Magnitude and yield estimation
The determination of mb is the prerequisite for a reliable es-
timation of the yield of a nuclear explosion. In order to ob-
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Figure 4. (a) Schematic sketch of five triangular basis functions
hl(t) with an equal weight of 1 and with a duration of 0.4 s each.
The focal sphere symbols indicate that the orientation of the source
mechanism is assumed to be constant during the rupture process.
(b) Simulation of a complex moment rate function (blue line) by
applying different weights to hl and linear superposition.
tain comparable results for the past six North Korean events,
mb is calculated from waveform peak values measured at
always the same 15 IMS seismic stations that recorded all
six events. These stations (MKAR, INK, FINES, WRA,
YKA, ASAR, AKASG, HFS, NOA, VRAC, GERES, STKA,
DAVOX, NVAR, PDAR) cover the entire azimuthal range
with a maximum gap of 121◦ and are located at distances
between 3700 and 9000 km from the Punggye-ri test site.
Exemplarily, the seismic signals at the German primary seis-
mic station GERES are shown in Fig. 9. The high similar-
ity between the six nuclear explosions stands out due to the
short and simple P-wave train. The recordings differ only in
their amplitudes. The resultant single station magnitude for
GERES was used together with the corresponding magni-
tudes of the other 14 stations involved to obtain reliable and
comparable average magnitudes.
For the 2017 test amb of 6.2 is calculated, compared tomb
values of 4.1 to 5.3 for the five preceding tests. In general it
is not possible to state one single relation between magnitude
and yield, as this relation depends on various factors, such as
the geological setting at the source site, the efficiency of wave
propagation from source to receiver, the depth of the explo-
sion, and the coupling of the source to the underground. A
number of empirical formulas of the typemb = A+B log(Y ),
with Y being seismic yield in kT TNT equivalent and A and
B being constants depending on the aforementioned factors,
have been developed to relate yield and mb. These relations
have been successfully used for yield calibration, for exam-
ple at the Nevada test site (Murphy, 1981), in Kazakhstan
(Ringdal et al., 1992), or in Nova Zemlya (Bowers et al.,
2001). As no particular magnitude–yield relation has been
approved so far for the North Korean test area, the latter
relation by Bowers et al. (2001) is used in this study. The
North Korean nuclear explosions were mainly conducted be-
neath the Mt. Mantap complex, consisting of stratified vol-
canics covering a basement of granite and diorite. In general,
wet hard rock can be taken into account for these geologi-
cal conditions, when the yield is estimated on the basis of
the seismic magnitude. Under these assumptions a yield of
around 400 kT TNT equivalent is estimated for the Septem-
ber 2017 test, clearly illustrating a steady increase in explo-
sive strength of the nuclear tests (see Fig. 10).
2.5 Influence of the Mt. Mantap topography
Two-dimensional synthetic wave-field simulations are used
to study the influence of topography of the Mt. Mantap com-
plex on the propagation of P- and S-wave energy emitted by
a point-like explosion source. A Chebyshev pseudo-spectral
method (e.g., Tessmer et al., 1992) is used for modeling
the elastic wave fields on a Cartesian 820× 512 grid for an
8 km× 5 km box in x and z direction, respectively. No varia-
tion in medium properties is assumed in the y direction. Fig-
ure 11 shows the model configurations as well as the wave
propagation for an explosion source at 0.6 km depth below
the surface (see Sect. 2.2).
The source time function is taken from Glasstone and
Dolan (1977, chapter 6), where the source duration is 0.15 s.
The wave field V is separated in divergence (|∇ ·V |) and
curl (|∇ ×V |) reflecting the P and SV energy, respectively.
Moreover, the wave propagation is considered for one model
without and two models with topography, whereas the to-
pography is considered for a west–east profile along 41.3◦ N
crossing the Mt. Mantap massif (see Fig. 1b). The velocity
model is chosen such that it reflects the petrology of the local
geology as described by Coblentz and Pabian (2015). How-
ever, strong lateral variations as thrust or normal faulting in
the uppermost layers are not taken into account due to rea-
sons of numerical stability. Instead lateral variations, which
are based on an exponential perturbation with a correlation
length of 100 m, are considered with differences in density,
P-, and S-wave velocities of±3 %. Merely the last model ac-
counts for erosion of the uppermost basaltic and volcanic lay-
ers as well as an almost vertical dyke reflecting the transition
between the granodiorites and the granite from west to east.
Nevertheless, computing the P divergence and SV curl in a
rectangular box shows large differences in the downward-
propagating wave fields, where strong increases for both pP-
and pS-wave amplitudes can be observed. The position and
the lateral extent of this box covers a slowness range from−9
to+9 s ◦−1, which are typical slowness values for teleseismic
P waves. For a source under Mt. Mantap, surface reflections
are increased in their amplitudes by a factor of ∼ 1.5 due to
topography.
Wave energy is focused due to the shape of the mountain,
especially from the easterly flank with a change in altitude
of approximately 600 m (see Fig. 1b). Topography is the cru-
cial factor; the difference between the two simulations with
and without a realistic geologic setting (see Fig. 11b and c)
is negligible. Further simulations for sources shallower and
deeper than the reference value of a depth of 0.6 km below
the surface provided similar pictures, whereas for sources
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Figure 5. Full waveform displacement and amplitude spectra fits (gray and red lines denote observations and synthetics, respectively) are
shown for the nuclear explosion for the vertical (a), transversal (b), and radial components (c). The top left side of each plot reports the
trace component (network, station, location, and component codes), epicentral distance, and azimuth. Waveform plots report the starting
time (relative to the origin time) and duration (in minutes and seconds) of the time window used (the gray background represents the applied
taper), while spectra plots report the frequency range in Hz. For geographical locations of the stations used, see Fig. 1a.
shallower than 0.5 km and deeper than 1.7 km, respectively,
energy focusing is less pronounced with amplifications in
amplitude of 1.3 and less. Although only a two-dimensional
model is considered, such simulations are also valid for the
three-dimensional space because Mt. Mantap exhibits a high
symmetry. In general, this numerical modeling gives indi-
cations of (1) the generation of clear infrasonic signals (see
Sect. 3) because topography (slope of Mt. Mantap) increases
the amount of radiated acoustic energy in the subhorizontal
direction, which is the usual propagation path for infrasound
(compare Fig. 12); (2) a reduced value of the isotropic part
obtained by MTI because a larger amount of S-wave energy
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Figure 6. Best moment tensor decomposition (top) and source type
plots (bottom) for the 2017 explosion. Top: the moment tensor de-
compositions reports the focal sphere for the full moment tensor,
and its isotropic and deviatoric components. The deviatoric compo-
nent is further decomposed into CLVD and DC terms. The relative
size of focal spheres scales with their relative magnitude. Bottom:
the source type diagram after Hudson et al. (1989) is used to judge
the moment tensor decomposition, illustrating the ensemble of best-
fitting solutions. Figure shows both solutions based on all available
data, as well as using data subsamples upon bootstrapping. The po-
sition of each solution (circles, focal sphere for selected solutions)
illustrates the moment tensor (MT) decomposition, while the focal
spheres (shown for selected solutions only) illustrate the geometry
of the DC term. The decomposition of the best solution is denoted
by a blue square.
is generated in the source region due to topography effects
above the source (see Sect. 2.3); (3) an overestimation of the
yield of the explosion because P and pP phases are consid-
ered as a single onset in teleseismic distances and in the in-
vestigated frequency range for shallow sources, leading to
an increase in maximum P-wave amplitude of approximately
1.3 and hence in mb of around 0.1; (4) no effect on differen-
tial travel times between P and pP phases due to topography
and therefore no effect on hypocenter depth estimation using
depth phase modeling (see Sect. 2.2).
3 Infrasound observations
For a shallow event in the given magnitude range, the ob-
servation of infrasound signals at distances of up to hun-
dreds of kilometers is generally expected (Mutschlecner and
Whitaker, 2005). Infrasound is subaudible sound below the
human hearing threshold of 16 Hz and is the dedicated mon-
itoring technology of the CTBTO for remotely detecting at-
mospheric explosions. Furthermore, infrasound can be used
in civil and scientific applications such as the monitoring of
volcanoes, meteoroids, ocean swell, and various other natural
and anthropogenic activities (see Le Pichon et al., 2010 for a
comprehensive overview). Infrasound signals are also gener-
ated by strong underground or underwater sources when the
generated waves couple into the atmosphere. The North Ko-
rean tests between 2006 and 2016 were investigated and reg-
istered by various infrasound arrays (Che et al., 2014; Assink
et al., 2016; Park et al., 2018; Koch and Pilger, 2018). Detec-
tions of the 2013 test by the IMS stations I30JP in Japan and
I45RU in Russia were part of the REB and thus confirmed the
underground nuclear test as a source of infrasound waves.
For the 2017 test, the station I45RU, located at a distance
of 401 km from the test site, detected infrasound signatures
from the nuclear test (see also Assink et al., 2018). Clear
waveforms undoubtedly associated with the nuclear test were
recorded and were again part of the REB. Figure 12a high-
lights the waveform beam of the Russian four-element infra-
sound array I45RU (denoted as the colocated seismic station
USRK in Fig. 1a).
Coherent waveform signals can be observed and associ-
ated with infrasound propagation from the nuclear test site
arriving at I45RU after travel times of 1450 and 1520 s, cor-
responding to celerities of 290 and 270 m s−1, respectively.
Preceding waveform activity at around 1350 s (315 m s−1)
can either be associated with infrasound radiation from an
extended (near-)epicentral source region or the fast acoustic
phase of an infrasonic forerunner (Evers and Haak, 2007).
These values are in the pure acoustic range and indicate
stratospheric ducting (Is2 with two reflections and Is1f with
one elongated reflection, turning heights of 40 to 55 km)
and thermospheric ducting (It, turning heights above 100 km)
(Drob et al., 2003). It is the first time that an underground
nuclear test is strong enough to generate distinct and far-
reaching pressure signatures that were clearly recorded at
a remote IMS infrasound station after propagation through
the thermosphere above 100 km altitude. The correspond-
ing Progressive Multi-Channel Correlation (PMCC; Cansi,
1995) analysis of the signal content in terms of time vari-
ation, frequency content, and back-azimuth direction is il-
lustrated in Fig. 12b. The PMCC method draws rectangu-
lar time–frequency windows wherever correlated signal en-
ergy in three or more array elements is present. Color-coded
back azimuths between 210 and 225◦ (southwest) point to-
wards the Punggye-ri nuclear test site with a true back az-
imuth of 218◦. Effects from cross winds (west to northwest,
strongest in the stratosphere) lead to the fact that the observed
back azimuths are some degrees lower, especially within the
stratospheric duct. The PMCC signatures with broadband
frequency content from 0.2 to 4 Hz can thus be clearly as-
sociated with the 2017 North Korean nuclear test.
Figure 12c models the propagation from the test site
epicenter to the station I45RU using a parabolic equation
and ray-tracing methods for the attenuation of signal am-
plitude and the connection of source and receiver by eigen
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Figure 7. Same as Fig. 5 but for the aftershock around 8 min after the test.
rays. A combination of European Centre for Medium-Range
Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) analysis data and climato-
logical profiles is implemented for temperature and wind
model backgrounds including gravity wave perturbations
(see Koch and Pilger, 2018, for further details on the meth-
ods and the atmospheric profiles used). The eigen rays show
that the stratospheric phases are about 170 and 70 s faster
than the thermospheric phase (caused by a higher effective
sound speed in the stratosphere and the longer wave path
for the thermospheric phase). The signal attenuation, as ob-
tained from parabolic-equation modeling, indicates that only
a small portion of signal energy is ducted in the stratosphere
caused by partial reflections from gravity wave variations in
the stratospheric mean background. This leads to about a 4
to 5 dB higher attenuation in the stratospheric duct and thus
stronger signal amplitudes in the thermospheric duct by a
factor of 1.6 to 1.8, which corresponds to the observed wave-
forms. The presented infrasound signals clearly observed
even at 401 km distance and with disadvantageous propaga-
tion conditions are indicative of a strong surface movement in
the epicentral area (see Sect. 4) of the underground test gen-
erating large acoustic pressure peaks as argued in Sect. 2.5.
Apart from the strong epicentral surface movement, infra-
sonic signatures were also identified from seismo-acoustic
coupling and the assumed cavity collapse associated with the
8 min subsequent aftershock (see the Supplement to this pa-
per for further information).
4 Remote-sensing studies
To visualize and characterize the surface imprint of the 2017
test, radar data from the ALOS-2 satellite (Suzuki et al.,
2009) and multispectral optical data from the Pleiades satel-
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Figure 8. Same as Fig. 6 but for the aftershock around 8 min after
the underground test.
Figure 9. Beam seismograms calculated from the vertical compo-
nents of the GERES array showing the P wave of the six North
Korean nuclear explosions. The seismograms are normalized to the
individual maximum amplitudes, for which the station magnitude is
estimated.
Figure 10. Magnitude–yield relation curves for different geological
settings. Numbered circles indicate the six North Korean nuclear
tests. Gray background shading represents lower and upper bound-
ary literature values for the different environments.
lite (Gleyzes et al., 2012) are investigated. Data from the
ALOS-2 satellite in the L band (1257.5 MHz frequency, 3 m
resolution) are analyzed by interferometric synthetic aper-
ture radar (InSAR) to investigate surface deformations (sub-
sidence and uplift) correlated with the 2017 test and its af-
tershocks. The method of change detection analysis based
on the Normalized Differential Vegetation Index (NDVI) is
applied. Spaceborne InSAR has been used to detect surface
displacements of the Earth’s surface for more than 20 years
(Massonnet et al., 1993) and has reached maturity in recent
years (Adam et al., 2009), nowadays allowing for the detec-
tion of surface displacements with a precision on the order
of a few millimeters. Repeat pass interferometry is based on
the registered interferometric phase per ground cell (pixel)
and is related to the distance differences between the scat-
terer and the synthetic aperture radar (SAR) sensor between
two acquisitions separated in time. The interferometric phase
measured as moduli 2π is thus ambiguous. To solve this am-
biguity, frequency estimations using unwrapping techniques
are calculated. The Earth’s curvature, topography, and atmo-
spheric effects influence the interferometric phase in addition
to surface displacements. These phase contributions have to
be estimated and subtracted to correctly estimate the surface
displacement (Kampes, 2006). In addition, the backscattered
electromagnetic signal between the acquisitions times needs
to be correlated or coherent. Decorrelation can be caused
by (1) temporal (large separation between the acquisitions
in time), (2) geometrical (large perpendicular baseline) and
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Figure 11. Snapshots obtained by and velocity model used for numerical simulations. P-wave velocities are indicated by shading according
to the gray scale map (for S-wave velocities we assume a vP/vS ratio of 1.73), as well as logarithmically scaled divergence (P-wave energy)
and curl (SV-wave energy) by bluish and greenish colors, respectively. The snapshots in (a) show the P- and SV-wave separated propagation
for an explosion source without topography, the middle panels with topography across the North Korean test site for a west–east profile
along 41.3◦ N with Mt. Mantap in the middle. Panels in (c) are similar to those in (b) but with a more realistic geological setting, where
erosion is accounted for. The time stamp of each snapshot is displayed in the upper left corner. The point source is beneath the center of
Mt. Mantap at a depth of 0.6 km below the surface. The panel below the snapshots compares the summed average divergence and curl
computed every 0.02 s in a rectangular box below the source for the case without (yellow) and the cases with (green and blue) topography.
The downward-propagating wave field shows strongly increased amplitudes for pP and pS phases in both cases of topography.
(3) scattering effects (incoherent movement of scattering el-
ements within the pixel; Gatelli et al., 1994).
Differential InSAR (DInSAR) processing was adjusted to
the test site target area regarding the abovementioned con-
straints. As the investigated area is located in a mountain-
ous region, DInSAR processing is challenging due to factors
such as limited visibility for SAR acquisition geometry, tro-
pospheric phase contributions, and/or snow cover and vege-
tation causing temporal phase de-correlations. DInSAR pro-
cessing encompasses the following steps: co-registration, fil-
tering, unwrapping, and the discussion of coherence. Coher-
ence serves as a measure of the quality in DInSAR studies,
with coherence values ranging from 0.0 to 1.0, with 1.0 sug-
gesting a perfect interferogram with no noise. For the analy-
sis of the surface displacement due to the 2017 test, data from
29 August and from 12 September 2017 are used, data coher-
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Figure 12. (a) Waveform beam of the four-element infrasound array I45RU with corresponding celerity values. (b) Progressive Multi-
Channel Correlation analysis in the same time frame for signal frequencies between 0.2 and 4 Hz. Information on back-azimuth direction
is color coded. True back azimuth from test site to station is 218◦. (c) Propagation modeling using ray tracing with gray-shaded travel-time
information for eigen rays from the test site to the station and color-coded attenuation information from parabolic-equation modeling. Is2 and
It denote the corresponding stratospheric and thermospheric arrivals after 1450 and 1520 s, respectively. Is1f shows the early signal detection
and theoretical ray path for an infrasonic forerunner.
ence between these two times has a mean value of 0.6 for the
investigated area. For areas that show surface deformation,
the coherence values range from 0.2 to 0.8.
Figure 13 shows the surface deformation at the test site
during the 2017 test restricted to pixels with coherence values
greater than 0.25.
In the central part of the Mt. Mantap massive, coherence
values dropped significantly below 0.25 due to very strong
ground deformations (see also Wang et al., 2018). The recog-
nition of the displacements is only possible in the line of
sight in the direction towards or away from the sensor. Due
to the incidence and look angle of the sensor measured with
respect to the ground and north direction, respectively, it is
not possible to fully resolve the amount of the vertical sur-
face displacement caused by the 2017 nuclear test. During
data acquisition on 29 August and 12 September 2017, the
sensor had an incidence angle of 43◦ and a look angle facing
east–northeast. These angles combined with the topography
of Mt. Mantap result in the maximum measurable percentage
of vertical surface displacement. For the western flank of Mt.
Mantap pointing towards the sensor with a slope of around
27◦, the percentage of resolvable surface displacement is
only around 30 %; for the eastern flank pointing away from
the sensor with a slope of around 10◦, the value of maximum
measurable surface displacement increases to around 80 %.
The resulting map of resolvable displacements clearly shows
an area of subsidence of up to 10 cm around 3 km north of
the main support area (compare Fig. 1b) and an area with
clear uplift of up to 10 cm west of the Mt. Mantap peak. DIn-
SAR processing of C-Band Sentinel data and Terra SAR-X
data for the 2017 test did not reveal acceptable quality mea-
sures regarding coherence in the central part of Mt. Mantap,
whereas for the tests in 2016 Sentinel data did show excellent
results (Hartmann et al., 2017; Wei, 2017). A study by Wang
et al. (2018) shows additional results based on amplitude
images from Terra SAR-X data and calculates 0.5 m sub-
sidence in the center and 3.5 m of horizontal displacement.
This strong spatial and temporal coincidence of the displace-
ment areas to the nuclear test site suggests a high correlation
with the underground test. To validate the displacement maps
of the DInSAR analysis of the nuclear test, Pleiades data sets
from 26 August and from 8 September 2017 were processed
to reveal surface characteristics related to the underground
test (Fig. 14). This relation is concluded by the strong tem-
www.solid-earth.net/10/59/2019/ Solid Earth, 10, 59–78, 2019
72 P. Gaebler et al.: Multi-technology analysis of the 2017 North Korean nuclear test
Figure 13. Surface displacements from DInSAR analysis for the
2017 North Korean nuclear test in September 2017. Coherence
threshold is set to 0.25. Data from the days 29 August and from
12 September 2017 are used. Arrows indicate slope direction and
angle. Numbered circles indicate the epicenters of the tests from
2006 to 2017. Black solid box delineates an area of around 3×4 km2
in which the surface displacement is between −10 and 10 cm.
poral and spatial connection of the landslides to the test and
aftershock origin time and epicenter locations.
Change detection analysis show numerous landslides acti-
vated during the test and aftershocks. As a result of the pro-
cessing of the ALOS-2 data, an area of around 3×4 km2 can
be delineated, where surface movement rates range between
−10 and 10 cm. For comparison, the area of the January 2016
North Korean nuclear test, which showed comparable surface
movement rates, was in the range of 1.5× 1.5 km2 (Hart-
mann et al., 2017). This large difference clearly underlines
the enormous power of the 2017 nuclear test. The strong sur-
face deformations at the surface observed for the 2017 test
might lead to pathways and the subsequent release of ra-
dionuclides, especially gaseous radionulcides such as 133Xe,
from the test site. Potential measurements of radionuclides
are discussed in the following Sect. 5.
5 Radionuclide monitoring and atmospheric transport
modeling
Measurements of radioactive fission products released into
the atmosphere even at great distances can deliver defini-
tive proof of the nuclear character of an explosion. To as-
sess the consistency between measurements and potential
source locations, the ATM method is applied (Becker et al.,
Figure 14. Change detection analysis via NDVI (Normalized Dif-
ference Vegetation Index) from Pleiades data showing potential
landslides (in purple patches) triggered by the 2017 nuclear test.
Numbered circles indicate the epicenters of the tests from 2006 to
2017.
2007; Ross et al., 2017). For the ATM analysis of potential
detections of radionuclides the Lagrangian particle disper-
sion model HYSPLIT (National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration – Air Resources Laboratory; Stein et al.,
2015) is used. The ATM is operated with meteorological data
from the US National Centers for Environmental Prediction
(NCEP). For the prediction of potentially affected radionu-
clide measurement stations, HYSPLIT is operated in forward
mode with hypothetical releases. For the assessment of the
potential source region of detected radioisotopes, the model
runs in backward mode. Dispersion simulations of a potential
immediate release after the explosion on 3 September 2017
show prevailing wind directions to the northeast (Fig. 15a).
According to the forward simulations, the IMS station
RN58 (Ussurysk, Russia) would have been affected, but it
was not operational at that time. Station RN38 (Takasaki,
Japan) would have been missed by the plume from the po-
tential release from the test site which is typical of the wind
patterns of the season. Stations further downwind, for exam-
ple in North America, would have required a larger release
for activity concentrations to exceed the detection threshold.
The South Korean Nuclear Safety and Security Commis-
sion (NSSC) issued a press release on 13 September 2017
with results of national efforts to detect radioactive Xe iso-
topes after the test. The statement “Considering the tim-
ing and location of sampling and air currents, the NSSC
could conclude that the air currents from the North Punggye-
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Figure 15. Atmospheric transport modeling results. (a) Forward dispersion modeling after 36 and 96 h for an immediate release on 3
September 2017. (b) Number of overlapping backward plumes for seven 133Xe detecting samples in northeastern South Korea from 7–
10 September 2017 (fixed to 42 h transport time for each sample). (c) High-resolution forward dispersion modeling after 36 h for a delayed
leakage on 4 October 2017. (d) Number of overlapping backward plumes for five 133Xe detecting samples at RN58 Ussurysk during October
2017 (transport time fixed at maximum sensitivity to North Korean test site).
ri area has been mixed to the sample and the Xe-133 de-
tected from this air sampling is relevant to the 6th nuclear
test of DPRK” (Nuclear Safety and Security Commission,
2017) was interpreted by the media as a source attribution.
Backward simulations for the samples collected at the north-
eastern stationary measurement system at Geojin were per-
formed using 500 000 model particles per sample and 0.5◦
GDAS (Global Data Assimilation System) meteorological
data. Additive overlay of the source regions of seven station-
ary 12 h samples with elevated 133Xe from 7 to 10 Septem-
ber 2017 points to the region where the Yongbyon North Ko-
rean Scientific Research Center is located, as a likely coin-
cident source (Fig. 15b), whereas the test site can be disre-
garded as a common source for the seven samples. This con-
tradicts the suggestions in the media that the detected 133Xe
originated from the test explosion.
Continued forward simulations for hypothetical releases
from the test site show that the station RN58 would have
been repeatedly affected by the plumes during October. Fig-
ure 15c shows as an example the dispersion after 36 h of a
hypothetical 10 h release on 4 October 2017 using HYSPLIT
with 0.25◦ GFS (Global Forecast System) data and 1 million
particles released. In fact, the station RN58 went back to op-
eration in between, and three peaks of elevated 133Xe activity
concentration were measured on the days indicated by rou-
tine forward simulations from the test site (5, 19, and 26 Oc-
tober). Those peaks consist of five samples with 133Xe ac-
tivity concentrations between 0.5 and 1 mBq m−3. Backward
ATM results also indicate a high sensitivity of these five sam-
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ples to being released from the test site. Figure 15d shows the
overlap of the corresponding retro-plumes at a time of max-
imum sensitivity to the test site. A leakage on the order of
1011 Bq133Xe would have been sufficient to explain the de-
tections at station RN58. Although the measurements and the
ATM are consistent with delayed small releases from the test
site in October, they cannot be unambiguously attributed to
the North Korean test explosion.
6 Discussion
A combination of seismological analysis using a double-
difference method and remote-sensing technologies results
in an epicenter location of the 2017 test of 41.3007◦ N,
129.0728◦ E, clearly placing the event inside the North Ko-
rean nuclear test site, at which all previous tests have been
conducted. The epicenter location is confirmed by results
from Wang et al. (2018), who estimated an epicenter location
of 41.300◦ N, 129.078◦ E ±50 m, which places the two epi-
center solutions only∼ 400 to 500 m apart. On 24 May 2018
North Korea invited international media to witness the de-
molition of the Punggye-ri test site. During a demonstration
North Korean officials presented a map showing the relative
locations of the six nuclear tests (CNN, 2018). Although the
correctness of the information provided by the North Ko-
rean government cannot be verified, comparisons indicate
that the assumed locations fit the results from the indepen-
dent relative location method reasonably well. Two indepen-
dent methods showed that the 2017 North Korea event was
very shallow. The full waveform moment tensor inversion in-
dicates a centroid depth within the range of about 2 km but
has a relatively poor resolution because of the long wave-
length of low-pass-filtered data. The depth phase modeling
of the P waveform was performed at 2.5 Hz and found a
centroid depth between 400 and 800 m. According to the
crustal profile at the source side, the expected P-wave wave-
length is ∼ 1000 m, which indicates that the source depth
is still resolved. This is supposedly the best absolute cen-
troid depth estimate possible from seismological data far
from the source. Depth estimations in this study are com-
parable to results from Wang et al. (2018). The authors used
numerical models to minimize the misfit between predicted
and observed surface displacements and specified a depth of
450± 100 m.
The explosive character of the 2017 event is confirmed by
MTI analysis, which indicates a dominant isotropic source
part of around 60 %. These results are supported by studies
by Liu et al. (2018) and Han et al. (2017), who also revealed
a dominant positive isotropic source part. Under the assump-
tion of the magnitude–yield relation following Bowers et al.
(2001), the estimated mb of 6.2 (see Sect. 2.4) for the event
results in a yield of 400 kT TNT equivalent. This value is
assumed to be an upper limit, as the following factors might
lead to a yield overestimation. (1) Topography at the test site
(see Sect. 2.5) strongly influences the radiation of seismic
energy from the source. This results in higher amplitudes of
the pP phase. As the hypocenter location is very shallow, P
and pP phases from the event arrive nearly simultaneously
at distant receivers and superimpose at frequencies relevant
for the estimation ofmb. This superimposition leads to an in-
crease of approximately 1.3 in P-wave amplitude in the far
field and consequently to an increase in mb of around 0.1.
(2) Furthermore, in the standard calculations of mb (Guten-
berg, 1945a, b; Bormann, 2012), distant-dependent correc-
tion curves, which are valid for a DC source, are applied.
Gaebler and Ceranna (2017) state that the use of correction
terms for a shallow explosion source can lead to an overes-
timation of mb of around 0.2. Taking both these effects into
account, the originally estimated value for mb of 6.2 had to
be considered as an upper limit estimate and has to be cor-
rected by a factor of up to 0.3. This correction leads to a
lower estimate for mb of 5.9, similar to M
(peak)
w that is es-
timated from the source time function, which translates to
an estimated yield of around 160 kT TNT equivalent. There-
fore, indications are strong that yield might be overestimated,
not only for the 2017 explosion but also for all five previous
North Korean nuclear tests.
Following the main event, around 8 min later, a large af-
tershock of local magnitude mL 4.1 was detected. MTI anal-
ysis of this event shows a clear negative isotropic part which
leads to the conclusion that this event is caused by at least a
partial collapse of the cavity formed by the main explosion.
These findings are again supported Liu et al. (2018) and Han
et al. (2017), who also find a clear negative isotropic source
part for the aftershock. According to Liu et al. (2018), the
aftershock can qualitatively be interpreted as a rapid destruc-
tion of an explosion-generated cracked rock chimney due to
cavity collapse. Following this strong aftershock, nine more
earthquakes with local magnitudes mL ranging from 2.5 up
to 3.2 were detected by the Korean Meteorological Agency
(Korean Meterological Agency, 2018) in the region (41.2 to
41.4◦ N, 129.0 to 129.2◦ E) until April 2018. Aftershocks of
such a magnitude range and quantity were not observed from
the five previous tests from 2006 to 2016 but are not unusual
for nuclear explosions of that size (Boucher et al., 1969).
In the aftermath of the 2017 event measurable surface ac-
tivity was detected in the region of the Punggye-ri test site.
Remote-sensing results suggest a distinct pattern of uplift (up
to 10 cm) in the western part of the Mt. Mantap massif and
subsidence (up to −10 cm) in the eastern part. The geologi-
cal interpretation by Coblentz and Pabian (2015) and Pabian
and Coblentz (2017) shows a north–south trend of various
geological units ranging from carbonates, diorites, granites,
and gneises in contact with a younger basalt (layered vol-
canics) at Mt. Mantap. Furthermore, the structural pattern in
the region suggests a north–south-trending system of faults
up to the main tunnel entrances, with a part of the fault sys-
tem branching out to the northwest. Considering this geolog-
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ical background the deformation pattern can be interpreted
as a (partial) uplift of the basement rocks in the western part.
Eventually this is structurally controlled by the north–south
trending reverse faults together with the unconformable cap-
ping of stratified volcanic sequences. This interpretation is
confirmed by multispectral optical data from the Pleiades
satellite which shows that the layered tuffs are strongly af-
fected by intensive landslide activities.
Overall, accounting for all these activities (surface defor-
mations, the collapse event, aftershocks, landslides) it can be
argued, that the internal structure beneath Mt. Mantap might
be strongly stressed and shattered due to the last six tests and
might be rendered useless for further test explosions (see also
Wang et al., 2018).
Despite these strong activities and the enormous release
of seismic energy from the event, no immediate release of
radionuclides was measured by the IMS. This is a strong in-
dication that no direct pathways from the cavity to the sur-
face for the propagation of radionuclides were created during
the test and the subsequent collapse-type aftershock. Only a
few days after the 2017 event, South Korea announced na-
tional measurements of 133Xe and proposed a connection
with these observations to the test. However, backward ATM
calculations performed in the context of this study disfavor
the Punggye-ri test site as possible origin for 133Xe but rather
point to the Yongbyon nuclear complex as a most likely co-
incident source region instead in September. Nevertheless,
in October 2017 three peaks of 133Xe were detected at the
IMS station RN58 in Ussurysk, Russia. Forward as well as
backward ATM show directly connecting dispersion condi-
tions and indicate the North Korean test site as a likely source
for the 133Xe detections. Nevertheless, other regional sources
cannot be excluded, and it was not possible to definitely iden-
tify the presence of 131mXe in the RN58 samples, which
– in the correct isotropic ratio – would have increased the
evidence of a nuclear explosion source (Kalinowski et al.,
2010), as for example shown for the 2013 North Korean nu-
clear explosion by Ringbom et al. (2014). According to cal-
culations of concentration and sensitivity, a release at the test
site on the order of a few 1011 Bq would have been sufficient
to cause and explain the detections at station RN58. This
is also quantitatively consistent as the required source term
ranges well below the remaining fission inventory even af-
ter 6 to 10 half-lifes of 133Xe (5.2 days) and a small leakage
through mountain cracks. However, a direct number of the
fission inventory is hard to estimate as the fission yield de-
pends not only on the explosive yield but also on the type of
nuclear device. Within the available data it is not possible to
determine if nuclear fusion was involved in the process. The
largest yield ever achieved by a boosted fission device was
720 kT TNT equivalent of the British Orange Herald in 1957.
For this explosion an amount of 118 kg 235U was mounted
(Arnold and Pyne, 2001). The explosive yield in this study
of between 160 and 400 kT TNT equivalent is therefore still
fully compatible with a fission-only device.
DInSAR results show a large area of strong displacement
in the case of the 2017 test, and it is not possible to de-
mark a definite surface location of the test epicenter from
these measurements. However, retrieving a ground truth from
DInSAR measurements from the January 2016 test, which
showed a clear and distinct maximum of surface displace-
ment, can help to provide an absolute epicenter location of
the 2017 test. By combining remote sensing and relative lo-
cations methods only the epicenter of the event can be es-
timated. A third method (depth phase modeling) is required
for the complete estimation of the 2017 test hypocenter. This
method is further able to provide an explanation for the large
difference in mb and Mw, which has not been observed in
this order for the previous tests. Furthermore while for pre-
vious weaker tests radionuclide measurements were able to
prove the nuclear character of the explosions (Ross et al.,
2017), radionuclide measurements alone in September 2017
could have been misleading with regard to the source area.
This examples clearly demonstrate that an integrated multi-
technology and multi-methodology approach is essential for
a reliable and comprehensive identification and characteriza-
tion of a potential nuclear test.
7 Conclusions
Overall, the following main conclusions can be deduced from
this study.
– The explosive character of the 3 September 2017 North
Korean event is confirmed by MTI analysis.
– The yield of the event is estimated to be around 400 kT
TNT equivalent with indications that this value should
be considered as an upper limit and might be as low as
160 kT TNT equivalent. This overestimation can be ex-
plained by the enhancement of peak amplitudes of tele-
seismic P waves due to topography and depth phase ef-
fects.
– The estimated yield of the nuclear device is certainly
smaller than the largest documented yield ever achieved
by a boosted fission device and is therefore still compat-
ible with a fission-only device.
– Strong surface deformations (±10 cm) are observed in
an area of 3× 4 km2. Comparisons of affected surface
area to the January 2016 test underline the enormous
power of the 2017 nuclear test. Furthermore, multiple
landslides as well as a number of aftershocks were ob-
served in the aftermath of the test.
– The aftershock directly following the nuclear explosion
has a similar depth as the test and can be characterized
as a collapse of the cavity created by the test.
– Infrasound signals measured at the station I45RU can
clearly be related to the 2017 event. It is the first time
www.solid-earth.net/10/59/2019/ Solid Earth, 10, 59–78, 2019
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that a thermospheric propagation path of infrasound
could be observed for an underground nuclear explo-
sion.
– No immediate measurements of radionuclides related
to the test in September were observable, but later oc-
currences of radionuclides are consistent with a delayed
leakage from the test site in October.
– The test site might have been strongly stressed and shat-
tered and thus rendered useless for further test activities.
The combination of the results from the different technolo-
gies and methods yields a reliable estimation of hypocen-
ter, magnitude, explosive energy, source mechanism, and an
indication of delayed leakage of 133Xe from the test site.
The cross-links between the different results complement
each other in a consistent manner. The multi-technology and
multi-methodology analysis presented in this study clearly
indicates that the September 2017 North Korean event was
in fact a nuclear test. Even in the phase of before its entry
into force, the CTBTO verification regime has again demon-
strated its readiness with respect to the recent nuclear test.
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